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Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) have expanded rapidly
in the past few years due to their ability to greatly expand commercial
and civilian aviation capabilities. As growth continues, many sUAS
operations will require coexistence with other aircraft operating within
the National Airspace System (NAS). For now, sUAS and other
Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) solutions currently have restricted
access to the NAS for their inability to detect-and-avoid other air traffic.
Safety is the primary concern and the critical challenge to overcome
among many regulatory and technological (sensing, command, control,
and communication) hurdles prior to full AAM integration into the
NAS. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the United States
national aviation authority, calls for a target level of safety equivalent to
the manned aircraft see-and-avoid requirement (FAA, 2021).
Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) and Detect-And-Avoid
(DAA) are two major obstacles in incorporating sUAS into NAS. A
successful UTM strategy will keep sUAS traffic secure and effective.
DAA is a key component to a successful UTM system, which can be
used by sUAS to track and avoid obstacles, other aircraft, and each
other. For sUAS to provide the essential target level of safety, DAA
systems will be required to be robust and reliable. Detection systems
and associated trackers, collision detection, risk assessment, collision
avoidance, and self-separation algorithms are typically included in a
complete working DAA system. Despite their limited capabilities,
vision-based DAA systems are becoming more common due to their
light weight and low cost. In addition, they provide more information
about the environment than other available sensors, making them ideal
for sUAS with limited payload power.
Over the years the need and use of sUAS has expanded into
avenues that have changed the way corporate, military, commercial
sectors are able to do business. This includes operating sUAS in
locations that are hard for humans to reach or requires extensive
equipment investment to do the job. To operate in the NAS, federal
restrictions require sUAS to perform similarly to manned aircraft. For
unmanned aircraft to maintain separation in congested airspace, this
presents the difficult issue of not having the human pilot as the last line
of defense. Therefore, DAA systems must achieve a level of safety that
is equivalent to manned pilots or better, while balancing size, weight,
and power constraints to maintain economic viability.
This research is the 6th installment to be completed and published by
the core research team. Previous studies focused on detecting and assessing
the collision potential of manned aircraft and sUAS by Visual Observers
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(VO) on the ground (Vance et al., 2017), airborne visibility of sUAS
equipped with strobe lighting by manned aircraft pilots (Wallace et at.,
2018), airborne visual detection by manned aircraft pilots of sUAS
equipped with and without ADS-B (Jacob et al., 2018), daytime manned
aircraft pilots’ visual detection of sUAS during final approach (Wallace et
al., 2019), and nighttime manned aircraft pilots’ visual detection of sUAS
during final approach (Loffi et al., 2021). All these studies showed a
consistent difficultly (less than a 30% sighting average) finding sUAS from
an airborne perspective – and with very few exceptions the sUAS had to be
in-motion to be sighted. This research generally replicates the daytime,
2018 airborne visibility of sUAS by manned aircraft research methodology
with the significant difference that this research flipped the detection
question where it was now the sUAS attempting to detect the manned
aircraft (Jacob et al., 2018; Wallace et al., 2018).
In the future, all sUAS will need to have some DAA capability. The
primary goal of this research is to test and evaluate encounter performance
of commercially available sUAS DAA systems and to determine capability
for safe sUAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS) operations. Two
different electro-optical (EO) DAA systems were tested against both sUAS
multirotor and fixed wing aircraft as well as manned aircraft. This paper
discusses only the manned aircraft methodological set-up and results.
Determining if the DAA systems are sufficient to fly sUAS safely without
VO is a corollary objective. The sUAS ownship aircraft will fly
autonomous missions while General Aviation (GA) aircraft (which will be
considered non-cooperative intruders) are flown to simulate possible
encounter scenarios.
For this study, testing was conducted through two stages. The first
stage was ground testing. Performing ground tests of DAA systems
provides important insight before actual flight of sUAS. These insights
allow DAA functionality and safety factors to be mitigated before
possible abnormalities occur during flight. Finally, flying the DAAequipped sUAS v. manned GA flights was conducted to show the
effects of orientation plays on the machine learning of the DAA system.
Literature Review
Through implementation of UTM, integration of manned and
unmanned aircraft in the NAS can improve the safety of the global
aviation system overall. The advent of commercial sUAS applications
and the democratization of the airspace is forcing faster integration of
the new UTM technology into the broader aviation operations While
this research centers on DAA integration and assessment specifically
for sUAS, it will have implications across the entire aviation sector.
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DAA Sensor Technologies – There are several safety structures that
help with general aviation traffic advisories and de-confliction. Some
of these include ADS-B, tower controllers that have radar services, and
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) that all help determine
location of aircraft. Therefore, as sUAS operations continue to expand,
the need for a robust and safe DAA system is present. Figure 1 shows
break down of DAA taxonomy.
Figure 1
Detect and Avoid Taxonomy (FAA, 2018)

Cooperative Technologies – Cooperative sensor technology is used to
receive signals of intent from other aircraft equipped with compatible
avionics and to determine their position. Cooperative sensors usually
have larger range than non-cooperative technology and are more
reliable.
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) – The main
cooperative technology utilized in the United States for manned aircraft
is TCAS. For the past several decades, TCAS has been used in
commercial aviation to reduce the danger of mid-air collisions (FAA,
2021). TCAS is a unit aboard manned aircraft that uses a transponder
to communicate the aircraft’s velocity, range and altitude with
neighboring aircraft to determine collision threats. An early assessment
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shows that TCAS would have to be extensively customized for sUAS,
else the standard TCAS would not be suitable for sUAS operational
characteristics and flying performance because sUAS are especially
cost-sensitive and payload-limited, current manned aircraft TCAS
transponder size and weight are incompatible for sUAS integration
(Fasano, 2016).
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) – Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast is an evolving solution to advance
airspace surveillance. Using Global Positioning System (GPS), position
of aircraft is broadcast to ground stations and other equipped aircraft
along with velocity and other pertinent information such as purpose and
identity. Figure 2 provides graphical representation of ADS-B. With a
range of 200 Nautical Miles (NM), ADS-B has been shown to be a
reliable source for data-link transmission. As part of Next Generation
Air Transportation (NextGen), FAA has regulated that all aircraft
operating in controlled airspace, where a transponder was previously
required, be installed with ADS-B sensors (FAA, 2021).
Figure 2
ADS-B Illustration of Surveillance (Daysix, 2021)

New advancements in commercial ADS-B have allowed it to be
integrated into sUAS with minimal size/weight/power impacts. Use
case examples for using transceivers for DAA can found elsewhere
(Harvey & O’Young, 2015; Mitchel et al., 2020). Due to its limitations
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in tracking uncooperative aircraft, ADS-B is not an all-around solution,
however. Additional onboard sensors should be paired to identify
aircraft without ADS-B and other air-to-air conflicts, such as birds.
Non-cooperative Technologies – As is needed for General Aviation (GA)
aircraft to have the capacity to detect and track airborne traffic
cooperatively, it is likewise needed for UAS to have the ability to sense
non-cooperative airborne traffic to operate safely with other GA aircraft.
Various technologies are currently available including active sensors such
as radar and LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), or passive sensors such
as EO/IR cameras and acoustic sensors. These systems are normally used
independently from one another but can also be combined for enhanced
collision avoidance.
Active Systems: LiDAR and Radar – LiDAR is a laser rangefinder that
scans a path radially to detect objects and is a frequent obstacle detection
sensor. LiDAR is popular because of its historically cheap cost in
comparison to other traditional aviation technologies like radar. LiDAR is
an active technology, which means it omits energy and measures time of
flight of the return of that energy back to the sensor to determine range to
a target. It is incredibly accurate but lacks long range. As LiDAR has to
travel out and back, the energy consumption is much greater to get the
ranges that are necessary to satisfy DAA standards as they emerge. This
system has tremendous accuracy capabilities for close range obstacle
detection and avoidance, but not long range DAA and it also lacks large
field of view (FOV). At present, main use cases for LiDAR consist of lowaltitude obstacle avoidance and terrain mapping (Ramasamy et al., 2016),
otherwise additional detection and tracking equipment is needed for air
traffic avoidance.
Active radar systems are non-cooperative sensors that emit
electromagnetic waves from a stationary antenna to surrounding objects
and then intercept the reflected signals (Euteneuer, 2014). There are a
variety of different benefits of radar sensors as compared to other types
of sensors, such as LiDAR, cameras, acoustic sensors, etc. Contrary to
optical systems, variables including rain, smoke, dust, fog, and sunlight
do not affect radar. In addition, radar systems may be utilized in aircraft
with high acoustic noise levels and can detect aircraft with low to no
sound emissions (something that is increasingly important as the
number of UAS using electric propulsion increases). Furthermore, radar
typically has improved range that can accurately sense targets from
further distances compared with other systems. Optical systems cannot
compete with typical radar ranges. The trade-off with radar is that it
must omit energy while optical does not. Another key aspect is the
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size/weight/power of radar systems. Larger detection range and higher
resolution, require higher power – a significant integration challenge
for a large majority of sUAS and even UAS (Nijsure, 2016). Finally, the
expensive cost of many airborne radar systems is one significant
concern that must be resolved before implementing radar DAA abilities
onboard sUAS for BVLOS operations.
Passive Systems: Acoustic Sensors and EO/IR Camera – Many
researchers agree that detecting sound using acoustic sensors onboard
sUAS is a difficult task (Harvey & O’Young, 2015). Aircraft, especially
GA, produce narrowband noise created from engines, rotors, or
propellers during flight. Small UAS can utilize acoustic sensors to
detect these aircraft by sensing frequency. As more electric platforms
enter the airspace, using acoustic sensors for DAA will become harder.
Having an additional system equipped such as a camera or radar will
help mitigate the acoustic range deficit.
Ranging from military to civilian applications, EO/IR cameras are
by far one of the most popular payloads utilized onboard UAS during
airborne missions. Recent literature is especially favorable towards
optics-based DAA systems that use cameras and computer vision
algorithms (Dolph et al, 2019; Lai et al., 2013; Minwalla et al., 2016;
Sevil et al., 2017; Ye et al., 2018). Most of the work conducted in this
research was formulated at evaluating EO DAA system. Computer
vision offers tremendous performance at the best low
cost/size/weight/power profiles as compared to other modalities.
Cameras are used as either primaryor secondary source of information
in the majority of DAA system architectures. Machine learning and
deep learning are two methods used for image processing for obstacle
detection (Ye et al., 2018). Commercial off the shelf (COTS) cameras
allow for cheaper integration. The cellular industry is driving the cost
point and form factor of sensors down to small packages and lower
prices without sacrificing performance. Looking at the growth curve
of sensing systems going forward, optical systems appear to have a
tremendous future.
Sensor Performance – Each of the sensing technologies discussed in
this section have their strengths and weaknesses, which are briefly listed
in Table 1. The environments that UAS operate in can be play a major
role on the preferred sensor equipment. Under most weather
circumstances, cooperative sensors (TCAS, ADS-B) can be used. In
addition to all-weather, ADS-B is low cost and meets sUAS
size/weight/power limitations. Non-cooperative passive methods
(acoustic or EO/IR) have the benefit of being inexpensive and capable
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of detecting mid-air, non-cooperative traffic; however, the range
capabilities for these sensors is much lower than other options.
Furthermore, E0/IR cameras are not accurate in poor weather and
acoustic sensors deliver low directional resolution. Airborne radar
sensors are heavy relative to sUAS payloads but do provide the ability
to work in all-weather conditions. LiDAR sensors could be installed on
sUAS but have range shortcomings for obstacle avoidance. What, then
is the best sensor for sUAS detection and tracking of non-cooperative
traffic?
Table 1
Summary of Sensor Performance
Sensor
TCAS
ADS-B
Radar
Lidar
Acoustic
EO
IR
Ground

Noncooperative
X
X
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Passive
sensing
X
X
X
X
✓
✓
✓
X

Weather
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
X
X
✓

Size/Weight/
Power
✓
✓
X
X
✓
✓
✓
X

Range

Cost

X
✓
✓
✓
X
X
X
✓

✓
✓
X
✓
✓
✓
✓
X

Collision Avoidance – The last line of defense in any manned air-toair encounter is the human pilot. FAR §91.113(b) states that it is the
pilot’s job to see and avoid other aircraft. It is equally crucial for sUAS
is to maintain separation between all aircraft.
Well Clear Contours – The FAA defines “Well-Clear” as a vertical
distance of 250’ or a horizontal distance of 2,000’ between manned
aircraft and sUAS (Trock & Keithley, 2018) – see Figure 3. Near MidAir Collision (NMAC) is defined as the cylindrical boundary around
sUAS which includes 100’ above or below sUAS and 500’ from sUAS
in radius (Weinert et al., 2020). Outside the NMAC cylindrical area is
the well clear volume. The model is a hockey-puck shape surrounding
the UAS with Well-Clear and NMAC distances. Avoiding NMAC is
becoming more important with increasing numbers of autonomous
vehicles in the sky. The goal is to perceive, detect, and avoid noncooperative traffic and keep the traffic outside the well clear volume.
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Figure 3
General Volume used to Represent Well-Clear and NMAC Conditions

DAA Metrics – The process of Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) begins with
scanning the environment around the UAS to detect for intruders and ends
with performing an avoidance maneuver when a threat to UAS has been
determined. For this function, larger detection ranges are advantageous and
desired. The range at first detection or range a target is first acquired is
defined as Rdet. Changes in Rdet depend on several factors such as size of
targets, environment setting, and sensor capabilities. Time-to-impact or to
collision, t0, is computed from Rdet if the ownship and intruder velocities
are known. Related to this is the time-to-invade metric, tevade, which defines
the minimum time to detect and avoid before collision is unavoidable. In
flight operations, t0 can only be estimated without full telemetry of other
aircraft such as non-cooperative. Therefore, Rdet is a more favorable metric
which is the focus of this study.
Methodology
A sUAS is used as the ownship for DAA testing with an array of
intruder aircraft, including multirotor sUAS, fixed wing sUAS, and GA
aircraft. The following sections describe electro-optical (EO) DAA
systems, the aircraft, flight test techniques, data set, and the evaluation
methods.
CASIA – The DAA equipment used in this study is manufactured by Iris
Automation. The DAA instrument “CASIA” (company product name, not
a corporate acronym), consists of a single forward-facing camera
connected. The CASIA uses a commercial-off-the shelf camera (Iris
Automation, 2020). Iris Automation offers three options: Standard CASIA
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(first commercially produced DAA system), CASIA I, and CASIA X. At
the time of this research, the standard CASIA and CASIA I as shown in
Figure 4, were the only ready-made devices.
Figure4
Iris Automation Standard DAACASIA and CASIA I (Iris Automation, 2020)

CASIA is a DAA system that uses electro-optical sensor and
computer vision to perform as an air safety net. The system accepts data
from ownship telemetry and aviation transponders to detect and avoid other
aircraft. For the two versions of CASIA used in this study, a single forwardfacing camera is mounted (CASIA X is composed of five cameras), with a
field of view of 80° horizontal and 50° vertical. CASIA processes the optics
from the camera and uses artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning
(ML) to determine aerial threats.
Electro-Optics – The first generation of CASIA was developed to provide
a solution to a difficult and complex problem, while maintaining cost
effectiveness. The Standard CASIA uses a FLIR Blackfly S camera body
with an Arecont Vision MPL4.0 CS lens that is used for the vision
detection. The camera is connected to the computation module using a USB
3.0, 30V, screw locking cable as demonstrated in Figures 5 and 6.
Machine Learning – The key component of the CASIA DAA functionality
is the computing module. The CASIA computing module works as the
decision maker, using computer vision and AI to sense cooperative and
non-cooperative traffic then relay to the autopilot to perform collision
avoidance maneuvers. The computing module is low in size, weight and
power. This makes for easy integration on sUAS platforms. Specifications
and its footprint can be found in Table 2 for quick reference.
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Table 2
Hardware Specifications for CASIA Systems (Iris Automation, 2020)

Input Voltage
Power
Mass
External Dimensions

Ambient Temperature
Ambient Humidity
Shock
Vibration
Aviation Environment
Times of Day
Field of Regard
Interfaces

Autopilot
Compatibility

11V - 40V DC
7 10 W Nominal, 15W Peak
CASIA Module: 291g;
Camera: 19g
CASIA: 77mm (W) x 110mm (L) x
36mm (D)
Camera: 60mm(W) x 60mm(L) x
105mm (D)
-25°C to 60°C*
85°C / 85% RH, 168 hours*
140G, 2ms
10Hz to 200Hz, 1G and 2G RMS
Visual
Meteorological
Conditions
(VMC)
30 minutes after sunrise,
30 minutes before sunset
Horizontal: 80 degrees
Vertical: 50 degrees
TTL Serial UART (x2)
CAN Bus (x2)
USB 3.0 [Host] (x2)GMSL (x2)
Ethernet (x1) Micro SD (x1)
Micro USB [Device] (x1)

Arducopter, Arduplane, PX4

Ownship Architecture – To perform testing of on-board DAA system, a
UAS platform must be chosen. The importance of size, weight, and power,
as well as cost play a role in this choosing. The choice of which UAS to be
used as ownship was made by conducting an in-depth analysis of the
vehicles’ flight parameters and evaluating integration features.
sUAS Aircraft – The decision to pick between a multirotor sUAS or a
fixed wing sUAS for ownship came down to endurance, best integration
capability, and thoroughly tested aircraft for risk mitigation. Based on

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol9/iss2/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2022.1701

10

Loffi et al.: Evaluation of Onboard Detect-and-Avoid System for sUAS BVLOS

convenience of vertical take-off and landing, low-cost tested aircraft, and
ease of equipping CASIA systems, a Foxtech Nimbus was chosen as the
ownship (see Figure 5). The Nimbus is a mid-sized Vertical Take-off and
Landing (VTOL) aircraft with a three-motor electric propulsion system. It
is constructed with light weight foam and has carbon fiber rod to house fix
tail rotor. Two other tilt motors are used to take off and then transition
forward for flight. The total cost for this airframe is around $5,000.
Figure 5
Foxtech Nimbus sUAS

DAA Integration – The ownship aircraft, Foxtech Nimbus, was partially
chosen based on good mounting possibilities for the CASIS camera and
module. The aircraft uses a 12,000 mAh battery to provide electric power
and is housed in the middle of the fuselage. For sUAS autonomous
missions, the Nimbus was equipped with the Pixhawk (Orange Cube) 2.1
autopilot from 3D Robotics that has ADS-B pass. The autopilot is secured
in the top bay of the aircraft which has a removable hard plastic cover for
protection.
The Nimbus includes a small payload bay directly underneath and
in between landing gear. This provides the best spot to mount the collision
avoidance subsystem as it is near the center-of-gravity. The payload bay is
used to house the data link communication module and controller receiver.
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Extension rails are needed to provide enough room for CASIA module. A
custom carbon fiber plate was cut by CNC (Computer Numerical Control)
to fit the dimensions of the rails and mounting holes of the module. A
uAvioni pingRX ADS-B In was used to provide cooperative traffic through
the Pixhawk to the CASIA (Figure 6). For fixed wing CASIA integration,
it is important to mount the camera to avoid propellers occluding the FOV.
As part of the Nimbus construction, the nose cone is removable. This
function provides swift changing between cameras during test days. The
integrated standard CASIA camera and CASIA I Camera can be seen in
Figures 6 as well.
Figure 6
CASIA Module Mounted under Nimbus and CASIA camera mounting.

A top-level block diagram is shown in Figure 7 to show the
configuration of the avionics system both for ground and airborne
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testing.
Figure 7
System Configuration for sUAS DAA System Testing

General Aviation (GA) Intruder Aircraft – The selected intruder
aircraft for this research are intended to press the limits for the CASIA
systems. The goal is to determine how the system will react in encounter
situations with each aircraft that is discussed below.
The GA plane selected in this work for flight operations was the
Cirrus SR20. The SR20 is commonly flown GA plane; its
representative size and shape provides a good example of intruder
aircraft that sUAS may encounter. The SR20 has a wingspan of 38‘,
length of 26‘, and max speed of 155 knots. A pingStation 2 is used to
monitor and log GPS coordinates of the SR20 for use in this research.
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The last three GA aircraft shown in Table 3 and Figure 8 are commonly
flown aircraft at Stillwater Regional Airport. These planes are used for
ground testing for the CASIA systems.
Table 3
GA Aircraft General Specifications
Parameter

Cirrus
Piper PA-44SR20
180 Seminole
GTOW [lbs]
2,122
3,800
Wingspan [ft]
38
39
Length [ft]
26
27.7
Useful load [lbs]
900
1,150
Propulsion
AvGas – 100LL
Autopilot
G-1000
Max Speed [KTAS] 155
168
Cruise Speed [KTAS]135
160
Range [NM]
1080
915

Cessna
C-172
2,550
36
27.2
870

Cessna
C - 152
1,670
33
24.1
500

126
110
640

Not equipped
109
95
415

Figure 8
Intruder GA Aircraft, left-to-right: SR20, PA-44-180, C-172, C-152

Encounter Scenarios – To perform evaluation state for the CASIA
system, a testbed for possible flight encounters needs to be classified.
The SR20 conducted flights at different fixed collision geometry per
the encounter scenarios shown in Table 4.
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Table 4
Summary of Encounter Geometries

Encounter Classification

Encounter Geometry

Headon

UAS Overtaken
Left-Converging

Right-Converging

Legend: UAS approach in Blue and Intruder in red.
Avoidance Maneuver – Considerations for encounter scenarios
included safe separation distances between aircraft of at least 2,000’
horizontal separation and 250’ in vertical separation. These are the
distances that are defined by the Well-Clear boundaries previously
introduced. When an avoidance maneuver is issued by CASIA, the
Remote Pilot-in-Command (RPIC = sUAS Pilot) is alerted and can tell
by the mode change of the autopilot which is displayed within the
Ground Station Control (GSC) software and can be configured to be an
auditory alert. Mission Planner displays this mode change in the User
Interface (UI) section in the white text shown in Figure 9. When the
avoidance maneuver occurs, the mode changes from Auto to Guided
mode.
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Figure 9
Mission Planner Guided Flight Mode during Maneuver

Autopilot telemetry data and intruder detection location are used
together by CASIS to construct an appropriate avoidance maneuver for
the operation and airspace configuration encountered. Once the CASIA
has detected intruder aircraft and deemed it necessary to avoid, CASIA
will conduct an avoidance maneuver by performing a right hand turn
decent and loiter. At the initial detection and start of a maneuver, the
Nimbus will be directed to descend by 30’ (this is a user-configured
altitude) and maintain that altitude for a parameter set of 30 seconds.
The Nimbus will loiter for this amount of time since last detection
elapses or until the remote pilot directs the aircraft to continue the
mission. The RPIC may exit an avoidance behavior by switching flight
modes or by issuing a new command.
Risk Mitigation – CASIA will engage a collision avoidance
maneuver only if the following parameters are met:
• A preset known as “Minimum Maneuver Altitude” prevents the
Nimbus from conducting any mode change of maneuver
behavior if the sUAS is below this set altitude. This setting
prevents unwanted actions at launch and landing. For all testing,
this value is set to 250‘.
• Flight mode must be in “Auto” before the CASIA will direct the
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autopilot to perform a maneuver. This safety net prevents the
RPIC from losing control when manually or semi-autonomously
controlling the Nimbus.
Ground Tests – The need to examine the CASIA systems on the
ground before utilizing resources and reducing risks is important. To
perform ground testing, the Nimbus aircraft with the CASIA system
onboard, was placed on elevated surface with the camera positioned in
the direction of intruder traffic.
Two phases of ground testing were conducted. Initial ground
testing was performed at Stillwater Regional Airport. Parking at the end
of the flight line, CASIA systems along with the equipped ADS-B was
tested against various, non-cooperative GA planes in operation at the
airport. Monitoring the coordinates of takeoff and landing of each GA
aircraft, alerts coming through the GCS, and tracking speed using Flight
Radar app, are all recorded during testing for post processing. The
second ground testing phase involved sUAS. These tests were
performed at OSU’s UAFS. To test against much smaller intruders, the
ownship was placed slightly on elevated surface while intruder aircraft
operated in front of it at different set distances. Data is recorded after
each flight. Ground testing was performed to not only to test CASIA
systems but to optimize settings and mishaps to best perform during
flight testing.
Flight Tests – Once ground test and trials proved successful flight test
proceeded. Both CASIA I and standard CASIA, were examined to
define their ability to see GA, detect GA, and then perform the
necessary safety avoidance maneuvers. To note, CASIA systems can
change the avoidance type maneuver depending on working
environment of the user. These settings must be applied before flights.
For all manned flight tests performed, the right-away rules are applied
upon detection and the Nimbus will descend at a 35° bank, dropping
50’ in altitude. As the trials are expensive to conduct, the CASIA I was
used for most of the encounters. The standard CASIA was used for one
head-on case to provide detection analysis against GA aircraft.
A more detailed examination of the four DAA sUAS/GA
encounter profiles (introduced in Table 4) used in flight test are show
in Figures 10a-d, respectively.
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Figure 10a
Trajectory 1) Ownship Flight Path in Red, SR20 in Blue

Figure 10b
Trajectory 2) Ownship Flight Path in Red, SR20 in Blue
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Figure 10c
Trajectory 3) Ownship Flight Path in Red, SR20 in Blue

Figure 10d
Trajectory 4) Ownship Flight Path in Red, SR20 in Blue
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Test trials begin when the pilot of the SR20 GA aircraft
announced over the radio when they were three minutes away from
UAFS. To ensure proper testing parameters, the sUAS ownship
established its autonomous waypoint missions before the GA entered
the test box for each scenario.
Limitations – Weather is a major component that limits the use of the
CASIA DAA system. Just like the human eye, if intruder cannot be
seen, it cannot be detected. There must be a minimum level of visual
condition clarity to be able to detect and track a non-cooperative target.
The main issues with these systems are the single forward-facing
cameras and FOV. Not being able to survey 360° around the aircraft
also inhibits situational awareness for the sUAS RPIC. Noncooperative aircraft color is also a limitation, if the color scheme blends
into the ambient atmosphere background, detection is inhibited.
Results
Flight Test Results – To test and evaluate the CASIA systems, the
presented four flight test encounter scenarios were implemented
sequentially. A range of challenging detecting conditions were collected
by flying in diverse cloud conditionsthat created complex backgrounds
and light rain conditions. Figure 11 shows an example image form the
CASIA I system during an overcast condition. The inset enlargement in
this figure is necessary to illustrate how challenging detection can be in these
atmospheric conditions.
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Figure 11
Example Image from CASIA System, Which Shows Threat Aircraft
M600 (a multi-rotor sUAS) at Range of 2,000’

Note. Figure 11. Insert shows magnified view of highlighted area.

Raw image CASIA I detection imagery from the SR20 at
different ranges is shown below in Figures 12. All detection distances
are show in the upper left corner in feet. These figures provide a
detailed insight to the machine learning the CASIA systems are using
to process detection information, determine threat, and then preform
avoidance maneuver.
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Figure 12
SR20 Raw Images from CASIA I
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Detection of the SR20 encounter scenarios was a success. The
CASIA I detected the SR20 aircraft in all but one scenario. In the sole
missed detection, the camera field of view played a factor where a headon approach was conducted. The SR20 was offset slightly to the West
of the UAFS runway causing it to be outside the frame of the CASIA
camera and thus not detected. This is a trade off when choosing lens
size for optimization of the DAA system. The 8mm lens provides a
longer detection range but has a smaller FOV compared to the 4mm
lens.
The average detection range for the CASIA I vs GA aircraft was
2,242’. This average is 200’ above the minimum well-clear standard.
Out of the eleven detections, three fell short of the 2,000’ requirement.
These short detections are primarily due to the timing of the line-ofsight from the CASIA during a turn and the location of the GA aircraft.
With every detection, a successful avoidance maneuver was conducted.
The various altitudes during detections are shown in Figure 13.
As shown in the figure, the ownship maintains a pretty level flight
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altitude of 400‘. Intentionally, ADS-B tracking was turned on for the
first pass of the GA aircraft to validate performance with cooperative
aircraft. Once the CASIA I detected the SR20 with it, ADS-B was
turned off for the rest of testing as to allow vision detections. Altitude
separation distances in general provided a safety net between the sUAS
and GA plane.
Figure 13
CASIA I vs SR20 Altitude Plot.

In the head on case scenario, the standard CASIA detected the
aircraft at 1,804‘. During the avoidance maneuver the CASIA detected
the intruder aircraft two more times at distances of 1,622’ and 1,605’
respectfully. This provided another answer to a key test point question
with what happens if multiple detections are made during avoidance. It
was expected that the standard CASIA would have a smaller
detection range basedoff previous tests, but it did provide key features
of detecting right under the threshold for well-clear. It is important to
note that ADS-B enhances these detection distances at a much larger
range. The results between the CASIA models are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5
Ownship vs SR20 Flight Summary
CASIA I
(8mm lens)
Number of Flights
Maximum Range (ft)
Minimum Range (ft)

11
3,759
1,289

Standard
CASIA (4mm
lens)
3
1,805
1,604

Choosing head on case scenarios, both speeds of aircraft are
combined to get the minimum time to avoid, also known as closer rate.
The standard well-clear and NMAC boundaries are used to provide
minimum levels of safety by ensuring ample time to avoid intruder
aircraft. The tested velocities for the ownship and SR20 intruder were
40 KTS and 125 KTS, respectively.
To determine the required time to avoid, the following equations
were used, where Pmitigated(NMACjEnc) represents the position of the
intruder aircraft with respect to the set boundaries of NMAC and Well
Clear. The ownship is assumed to have a lateral maneuver speed of 40
KTS, maintaining set speed. Time between intrusion for the maximum
and minimum range for CASIA systems are used.
Well Clear time to avoid (sec) = Pmitigated(LoWCjEnc)/
Punmitigated(LoWCjEnc)
NMAC
time
to
avoid
(sec)
=
Pmitigated(NMACjEnc)/Punmitigated(NMACjEnc)
For lateral boundary requirements of 2,000’ for Well Clear and
500’ for NMAC, the time required to avoid is 24 seconds and 7.5
seconds, respectively. For CASIA I the minimum detection range of
1,289’ gave 2.83 seconds to meet NMAC. This is not enough time to
meet well-clear nor the NMAC boundary. For the max detection of
3,759’, this provided 6.32 seconds to reach well-clear and 11.7 seconds
toreach NMAC. While this does not meet the well-clear requirements,
it does provide enough time to avoid NMAC boundary. The results with
both CASIA I and standard CASIA are presented in Table 6.
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Table 6
Ownship vs GA Aircraft Well Clear and NMAC Boundary Results

Time
intrusion
CASIA I
Well-Clear
NMAC
Standard CASIA
Well-Clear
NMAC

to

@ 1,289’; @ 3,759’
-2.55 s; 6.32 s
2.83 s; 11.70 s
@ 1,604’; @ 1,805’
-1.42 s; -0.70 s
3.96 s; 4.68 s

Avoidance
Requireme
nt

Time
Avoid

2,000’
500’

24 s
7.5 s

2,000’
500’

24 s
7.5 s

to

BVLOS – With a diverse terrain, Choctaw Nation Ranch was
chosen as the location to carry out two BVLOS operation system
testing. This site provided an extra testing advantage of analyzing the
effects of large elevation changes. The first BVLOS mission was
constructed to fly 2 NM radius, one-way, then 1 NM the opposite
direction from the home point for approximately 6 NM in total travel
distance. The second BVLOS mission included similar flight pattern
but stepped out to 3 NM BVLOS and a total of 8 NM traveled. Flights
were conducted in clear sky conditionsat a nominal altitude of 400’
Above Ground Level (AGL). To simulate intruder scenario, the Nimbus
was tested against another sUAS aircraft DJI Mavic flying 350’ AGL
near the starting location.
As the flight logs show in Figure 14 and 15, BVLOS flights are
conducted in two different flights. The initial flight had a 2 NM radius
and the latter 3 NM. The cruise altitude achieved was approximately
400’ AGL. During BVLOS flights, the sUAS was only seen during
takeoff and landing at the home point. Once the Nimbus reached desired
altitude, the RPIC and other ground operators had to rely on autopilot
Command and Control (C2) link to monitor status of sUAS, which
included attitude (roll, pitch, and yaw) and position from the GCS.
The flights tested showed that the CASIA I system can perform
BVLOS flight operations with no issues in either mission. Additionally,
extended C2 links and terrain following within autopilot, were also
examined. The C2 link lowest signal was 50 percent when the ownship
was making the turn to head back to the home point during the 2 NM
flight. Terrain following also proved to be successful by maintaining
400’ AGL with changes in elevation from 700’ to 1,100’ AGL. The
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CASIA sUAS DAA system can provide a level of mitigation for
collision avoidance by triggering flight maneuvers before NMAC
occurs by helping the RPIC identify intruders.
Figure 14
CASIA I 2 NM BVLOS Test

Figure 15
CASIA I 3 NM BVLOS Test
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Conclusions
This study investigated two onboard collision avoidance
systems for sUAS autonomous operations. Using computer vision and
machine learning, it was demonstrated that GA planes above the
horizon can be detected and tracked in dynamic environments. Using
Well Clear and NMAC boundary requirements, the CASIA vision
system provided sufficient alerting and detection to maneuver before
reaching the crucial NMAC layer. The results showed that size of the
intruder aircraft, weather conditions, shape/color of aircraft, and flight
encounter geometry play a part in detection ranges. Cooperative and
non-cooperative GA planes results shows high level detection
especially with ADS-B triggering capabilities. Using geometrical
detection equations to determine detection range based off pixel camera
and lens sizes proved to be accurate only in some cases.
Figure 16 shows Number of Detections per Airframe versus
intruder detection ranges for Standard CASIA and CASIA I. For the
SR-20 GA aircraft, detection rates between the two computer vision
systems leans favorably for CASIA I with eleven detections vs only
three for the standard CASIA. The data does show a consistent, reliable
ability to detect intruders at greater than 2000 ~ ft slant range for
CASIA I with just three encounters under that mark. Detection range
for the standard CASIA has smaller dection range of average 1640 ~ ft.
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Figure 16
Detection Ranges for Standard CASIA and CASIA I from All FlightTesting Intruders vs Number of Detections per Airframe

The standard CASIA provides a well-rounded system when it
comes to initial DAA ranges, however, the 70 % larger lens size allows
the CASIA I to outperform standard CASIA by number of triggered
detections and range. Testing results were used to test the optimization
of the DAA systems and determine detection ranges. Although most
testing used CASIA I, given favorable weather, both systems
performed well with detecting collision-course intruders within the
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FOV.
Trying to achieve the goal of last line-of-sight, i.e., the manned
pilot advantage, and no requirements of FOV, the standard CASIA
provides the capability to be used in certain missions, such as, pipeline
tracking and power line inspections in rural areas potentially helping to
relieve personnel operations and remove the number of VOs. However,
the longer detection range, CASIA I presents the best option between
the two DAA systems.
Depending on aircraft at hand, it can be hard to deploy all these
mitigations simultaneously. Optical DAA provides a broad set of
operational environments and concepts of operations that can be met
but having other mitigations like infrastructure masking and controlled
airspace to improve safe operations are part of the equation. When the
threshold objective is to satisfy the last line of defense, just like the
human pilot does, always avoiding penetrating the NMAC boundary is
critical. Aerodynamics, payload size, endurance, and versatility are
resourceful parameters when bringing BVLOS operations into
consideration.
The FAA BEYOND program is designed to explore use cases
of DAA systems in different environments (FAA, 2021). This data will
be used to inform the regulators of performance, insight of setting the
correct low airspace requirements, and get to a rule making that gives
level of safety needed for sUAS to integrate into the NAS. With new
algorithmic solutions, hardware miniaturization, and increases in
computational power the future for BVLOS appears optimistic. The
concluded study results show the CASIA systems do provide a high
level of operational performance for sUAS in the sky, especially on a
cost/size/weight/power basis. They unfortunately are not a panacea.
There is a need for a fusion of systems to bring the level of DAA safety
for FAA approval. Iris Automation’s low cost/size/weight/power on
board sUAS DAA systems have proved to be a viable option to relieve
some or all VOs for BVLOS operations.
Recommendations for Future Work – The results from this
research provided initial insight to the capabilities of an onboard sUAS
EO DAA systems but more work is needed to advance DAA
capabilities such as changing the avoidance maneuver types mid-flight.
For example, with the Nimbus being a VTOL aircraft, it would be
prudent to determine how changing maneuvers from right-decent to
guided-hover during operation would affect the autopilot, CASIA
system, and flight performance all around.
To extend BVLOS flights, more data link testing is needed to
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achieve a higher-level of safety by always maintaining control of the
sUAS. Safety mitigations if RPIC communications with the sUAS are
lost are crucial to define. More BVLOS flight testing will help answer
this need. Other parameters not tested include a) allowing multiple
intruders flying at the same time, b) how the CASIA vision system
keeps track of intruders during an avoidance maneuver, c) advantages
and necessity of a 360° FOV DAA system, and d) can the CASIA
mature into a stand-alone avoidance system?
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